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WHAT IS THE VALUE OF FAITH FOR SALVATION?  
A THOMISTIC RESPONSE TO KVANVIG
James Dominic Rooney, OP
Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a non-cognitive theory of faith. He argues 
that the model of faith as essentially involving assent to propositions is of 
no value. In response, I propose a Thomistic cognitive theory of faith that 
both avoids Kvanvig’s criticism and presents a richer and more inclusive ac-
count of how faith is intrinsically valuable. I show these accounts of faith 
diverge in what they take as the goal of the Christian life: personal relation-
ship with God or an external state of affairs. For this reason, more seriously, 
the non-cognitivist project likely requires rejecting traditional Christianity 
and its picture of salvation.
It has been a hot item in Catholic theology of the past fifty years to rail 
against “propositional” theories of faith and revelation, where these es-
sentially involve “conceptual knowledge by means of words (speech).”1 
In response to these theories, Catholic theologians have felt the need to 
explore a tighter connection between belief and action.2 These Catholic 
theologians were inspired by a movement in Protestant theology, begin-
ning more or less with Kant, to separate metaphysics and faith. What has 
for some time occupied theologians has come around to philosophy: con-
temporary philosophers of religion have likewise begun recently to voice 
a concern that classical theories of the virtue of faith are unsatisfactory 
because they construe faith as constituted essentially (in part or whole) by 
belief in certain propositions. Jonathan Kvanvig, who I treat here, argues 
that the traditional model of faith makes faith of no apparent value in 
1Dulles, Models of Revelation, 42. The work generally is useful as an overview of positions 
in Catholic theology of revelation at that time. 
2This was particularly associated with “liberation” theologians, such as Gustavo Guti-
errez or Leonardo Boff. Nevertheless, liberation theologians generally take a non-cognitive 
view of faith as an assumption rather than defend it. I speculate that Edward Schillebeeckx is 
chiefly to be credited with popularizing something like a non-cognitive view of faith among 
theologians of that generation, and it was from him that the liberation theologians appear to 
have derived their view. 
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ordinary people’s lives. This has led Kvanvig, among others,3 to defend 
a distinctly non-cognitivist theory of faith which does not essentially or 
constitutively involve belief in any set of propositions.
After presenting Kvanvig’s theory of non-cognitive faith and his ob-
jections to the cognitive model, I will examine one cognitive theory that 
proposes a clear internal connection between belief and the value of faith. 
Thomas Aquinas holds that there needs to be a cognitive virtue (namely, 
faith), constitutively involving assent to propositions, in order for believers 
to have a relationship with God. Nevertheless, I argue that Thomistic faith 
is not susceptible to the objections that Kvanvig proposes which motivate 
non-cognitivism. Thomistic faith is a species of intellectual humility where 
the believer trusts God and what He tells human beings. Thomistic faith 
accommodates the “implicit faith” of those outside explicit Christian con-
fessions, and can positively construe traditional concern for orthodoxy by 
understanding “heresy” as a sin of intellectual pride that impairs commu-
nion with God (but innocent doctrinal error or ignorance as blameless).
Kvanvig argues that we should develop our theory of faith in light of 
why that virtue is valuable. I will show that the Thomistic account makes 
cognitive faith more intrinsically valuable than affective faith. Neverthe-
less, there is a deeper problem: affective and Thomistic faith have different 
conceptions of the goal of Christian life (i.e., salvation). I will show that 
accepting that non-cognitive affective faith is “saving faith” (as Kvanvig 
does) would entail the falsity of the traditional Christian picture of salva-
tion. While I cannot argue that the traditional Christian picture is in fact 
true, I will present good reasons to reject non-cognitivism.
1. Kvanvig’s View
1.a. Motivation for Non-Cognitivism
Cognitive models of faith hold that belief, particularly propositional belief, 
is essential to faith. In the beginning of Faith and Humility, Kvanvig pro-
poses two general objections to these dominant models of a “cognitive” 
virtue of faith. These objections motivate a commitment to an alterna-
tive model of faith—the non-cognitive, affective model of faith Kvanvig 
proposes—on which propositions or beliefs might be compatible with 
affective faith but are not essential to it.4
3Daniel Howard-Snyder proposes “nondoxasticism” about faith, which is similar in 
many respects to Kvanvig’s “non-cognitivism.” I believe similar criticisms as those presented 
against Kvanvig’s position would likely apply to Howard-Snyder’s view. Nevertheless, 
Howard-Snyder’s nondoxasticism (in his account of Markan “propositional faith”) involves 
essential, positive cognitive attitudes toward propositions which are not however identical 
with belief in those propositions; instead of belief, faith can take various other distinct dox-
astic states of some kind. The idea is that a specially-defined state of belief is not essential to 
faith. This makes the arguments as presented here against Kvanvig not directly applicable to 
the nondoxastic view. Howard-Snyder has a number of articles on this topic, the more recent 
being: “Markan Faith”; “Three Arguments to Think that Faith Does Not Entail Belief”; “Can 
Fictionalists Have Faith? It all Depends.”
4Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 19. 
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A first objection to cognitivism is that belief in a set of propositions is 
not obviously virtuous. If a state of belief in some propositions is valuable, 
it seems only to have whatever value attaches to true belief in general. In 
turn, the value of mere true belief is (at least mostly) constituted by the 
value of the propositions believed.5 True belief that my car’s radiator is 
faulty might be very valuable because use of my car is valuable to me, 
whereas true belief that there are fifty motes of dust on my desk is prob-
ably useless.
In addition, there is a uniquely religious facet to this first objection. 
If faith is necessary for salvation, such that nobody can “get to heaven” 
without it, God would seem fundamentally arbitrary and capricious to 
demand that people believe in some disjointed set of propositions that 
bear no apparent connection to their moral character. Cognitivism makes 
faith a trivial affair: “of all the concerns God might have about human 
beings and the lives that they live, how could it come down to something 
like a true/false checklist that you fill out honestly, and the answers de-
termine your destiny?”6 It would be as if God demanded, as a price of 
admission, that one get a tattoo on their forearm, or cut off their left toe.7 
But we know too that people come to believe what they believe largely 
from matters of circumstance outside of their control—children of Jewish 
parents are often also Jewish, etc. For this reason, Kvanvig concludes “the 
idea that the difference-maker regarding one’s eternal destiny is simply 
a matter of being in the right cognitive state is no better than the idea 
that the difference-maker regarding one’s eternal destiny is a tattoo on the 
right forearm or a missing little toe on the right foot.”8
Second, cognitive accounts would limit faith to those who explicitly 
profess or believe given propositions. This seems to rule out that faith 
could be a natural virtue, one that would be worth having for human 
life even outside religious contexts.9 Instead, Kvanvig proposes, a proper 
theology of faith can only be grounded upon this prior answer of how 
faith, generally, plays a beneficial role in human life: “In particular, what 
is [faith] for, that could possibly sustain a theology built around it, or up-
hold the idea that it is a major virtue of a well-lived life?”10 Further, when 
Kvanvig develops his account of affective faith, he presents cases where 
people can have faith that is non-religious, or faith without beliefs at all, as 
in the case of a Little League pitcher who has faith in his ideal of becoming 
a better pitcher.11
5Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 11.
6Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 107–108. 
7Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 11.
8Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 107. 
9Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 15. 
10Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 15. 
11Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 19–20. 
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Again, there is a uniquely religious facet to this second objection. Iden-
tifying faith with belief in a given set of propositions will rule out that 
large numbers of people are saved. On such a cognitive theory of faith as 
belief in some particular list of propositions, if a person failed to believe 
one proposition in the list, they would fail to have faith. This is true even 
of the beliefs traditionally claimed to be so required for salvation, as for 
example those identified in the Athanasian Creed. Moses, Abraham, and 
the Apostles cannot be claimed plausibly to have held the propositions 
identified in the Athanasian Creed as necessary for salvation. And, further, 
the vast majority of people do not hold any particular beliefs in common 
which we could jointly identify as required for salvation.12 Many people 
would then end up in hell. As a consequence, the cognitivist theory seems 
to be uncharitable: “It shows smallness of spirit to think that Nestorians, 
for example, are damned because of their beliefs. The most that could 
plausibly be claimed is that there will be no Nestorians in heaven—by the 
time they get there, they will have seen the light.”13
1.b. Non-Cognitive Affective Faith
Kvanvig argues that, given the failure of cognitive faith to describe some-
thing of value, we should begin by describing why faith is valuable, and 
found our theory of faith on the role that it plays in people’s lives.14 As 
Kvanvig sees it, there is a clear reason that people value faith. Faith is a 
trait of character which plays a role in people’s lives and the way faith 
functions should “count as a good thing” for the people who have this 
trait.15 For faith to have these characteristics, to play a good role in people’s 
lives, is merely for faith to be like any other virtuous trait of character. 
What distinguishes affective faith from other virtues is that faith plays a 
particular role. He defines affective faith as follows: “Faith . . . [is] an ori-
entation or disposition toward the retaining of the goal or plan or project 
in the face of difficulties in achieving it, one prompted by affections of 
various sorts and involving complex mental states that are fundamentally 
affective even if they involve cognitive dimensions as well.”16 This faith is 
obviously not uniquely religious, and Kvanvig sees this as an advantage 
of the account. Examples of non-religious faith might be a Little League 
pitcher persevering toward his athletic goals despite adversity.17
Faith’s (natural) purpose is, for Kvanvig, giving meaning to one’s life or 
unifying the projects one pursues because the faithful person acts in pursuit 
of an ideal. If this is true, Kvanvig argues, mere assent to a set of proposi-
tions of any kind can never fill this role. And Kvanvig is quite liberal with 
12Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 13–14.
13Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 136.
14Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 15. 
15Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 15. 
16Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 15.
17Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 19. 
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what counts as an “ideal.” He criticizes Dewey (who offered a similar view 
of faith) for proposing limiting criteria supposedly internal to the nature 
of ideality to criticize some ideals, such as narrow-minded narcissism, as 
failing to be “ideals” of the right kind. By contrast, Kvanvig’s account of 
affective faith is descriptive and functional rather than normative, and so 
he holds there are no conditions internal to ideals to distinguish one from 
another. A selfish person acting only in their own narcissistic self-interest 
counts as acting in service of an ideal. And we can admire the character 
trait of pursuing these ideals, even when those ideals are morally nox-
ious: “pursuing Nazi goals in the face of considerable danger is certainly 
odious behavior . . . but the question is whether it can nonetheless involve 
a display of courage.”18 Kvanvig thinks it does, as “one should be able to 
approve the character trait while disapproving the end pursued.”19
What is the role of belief in affective faith? Although beliefs might ac-
cidentally follow from the affective state (e.g., one comes to have certain 
beliefs after committing to an ideal),20 Kvanvig rejects that belief in propo-
sitions has an intrinsic role in constituting that one has affective faith. The 
value of faith for Kvanvig is that faith gives unified meaning to human 
life in the face of difficulties, and such faith does not ordinarily require 
ontological commitment or beliefs in any particular set of propositions.21 
This does not rule out that people of faith have cognitive commitments of 
any kind. Instead, “affective faith and the way of life embodying it will 
always involve cognitive commitments of one sort or another: how could 
it not? . . . the point, however, is that the precise nature of those cognitive 
commitments is quite indeterminate.”22
At other times, Kvanvig appears to insist on the “multiple realizability” 
of what it is to act in service of an ideal such that no particular cognitive 
states are required for acting in that way: “The pattern [of behavior] is 
multiply realizable by a wide variety of underlying intentional states and 
attitudes. . . . What matters is that the responses fall into a pattern of the 
sort that counts as an instance of that disposition.”23 He does briefly note 
that two particular people do not exemplify exactly the same pattern of 
behavior, given that they do not have exactly the same (inessential) cog-
nitive and affective states that accompany the disposition to produce the 
pattern of behavior, but Kvanvig is not demanding exactly the same pat-
tern; rather, “what we look for is some high degree of overall similarity.”24
But this seems confused. Kvanvig vacillates between saying, as in the 
first case, that affective faith requires indeterminate cognitive content, and, 
18Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 65.
19Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 65.
20Kvanvig, “Affective Theism,” 125. 
21Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 112–113. 
22Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 135. 
23Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 128. 
24Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 129. 
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in the second case, that affective faith requires no particular cognitive con-
tent. These do not strike me as obviously identical. One could have some 
basic cognitive disposition, a doxastic state, and yet have no particular 
proposition in mind—my mental state would be indeterminate. Perhaps 
I believe somebody is the President of the United States, but I do not have 
a proposition in mind as to who that is. This seems to me a way someone 
could have indeterminate cognitive content. Nevertheless, what Kvanvig 
seems to mean is the second rather than the first: he insists that the same 
disposition to act a certain way, to produce a pattern of behaviors, can exist 
without any other cognitive or affective dispositions being required for or 
essential for the production of that pattern. It will become important to 
distinguish that claim from the very different claim that some cognitive 
or affective attitudes are necessary to support some disposition, but what 
these attitudes are can differ among instances according to some norm, or 
involve non-propositional cognitive content, etc. (and so be indeterminate).
Finally, Kvanvig sees religious affective faith as a sub-species of the 
general case: whereas affective faith is a disposition to act in service of an 
ideal, religious affective faith is acting in service of a religious ideal. As 
Kvanvig notes, “In the Christian tradition faith is supposed to be central to 
salvation.”25 Yet “the centrality of faith to salvation doesn’t by itself yield 
the right kind of defense of it. In order to assess the significance of the 
kind of faith in question, we begin by asking . . . why would it be that 
this particular phenomenon is so central to eternal salvation?”26 Kvanvig 
then argues that non-cognitivism makes an internal relation of faith to 
salvation clear: “an account of faith in terms of dispositions to respond 
in service of an ideal is easily seen as being internally related to a pro-
cess of reconciliation when the ideal itself is or involves the coming of the 
Kingdom of God and what it represents.”27
Despite Kvanvig’s occasional use of the term “saving faith,” there is no 
further explicit elaboration of what Christian salvation involves. But, as I 
will present in my objections, there are enough statements of what saving 
faith is not that allows us to (by contrast) reconstruct Kvanvig’s picture. 
One of those clear denials is believers need not have any cognitive beliefs 
about Christianity, including beliefs that any Christian doctrine is true, in 
order to count as having affective faith in Christ:
even if it is in some sense required that one come at some point to believe 
certain things and to adopt a particular cognitive perspective on all there is 
and one’s place in it, it would be a strange gospel to impose this requirement 
in the backtracking fashion that insists that what must be true in the end in 
order to be saved must be true now in order to be being saved.28
25Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 105. 
26Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 105.
27Kvanvig, “Affective Theism,” 107.
28Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 136.
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Kvanvig is clear (as we will see) in holding that anyone could conceivably 
commit to acting as a “believer” with affective faith, following Christ or 
bringing about the Kingdom, even while consciously denying that Christ 
ever existed.
However, Kvanvig likely holds that there is no need to give an elaborate 
account of salvation because the model of affective religious faith is func-
tional, like the account of affective faith generally speaking. Then, because 
there are no constitutive beliefs or attitudes other than a disposition to act 
for an ideal, we do not need to specify what that Christian ideal actually 
is. As long as there is some distinctively Christian ideal, such as following 
Jesus, and someone counts as acting in service of that, they thereby count 
as having saving faith. Naturally, Christians will hold that their ideal is 
worth pursuing, so affective religious faith that commits one to pursuing 
Christian ideals is valuable. Thus, nothing further needs to be said about 
salvation.
2. Thomas Aquinas
2.a. Salvation as Deification
Thomas Aquinas constructs the account of faith in the Summa Theologiae 
in the context of an explicit elaboration of the goal of Christian life. He 
does this for reasons similar to Kvanvig: Aquinas wants to show why faith 
is valuable. In general, Aquinas holds that the end of human life lies es-
sentially in contemplation of God’s essence (the “Beatific Vision”).29 For 
my purposes, I will focus only on the way Aquinas thinks we can attain 
this goal. Aquinas, I argue, presents a plausible picture of human life as 
finding its perfection in relationship with God. Aquinas then shows this 
picture of salvation entails that human beings need a cognitive virtue in 
order to engage in a relationship with God, and he identifies faith as that 
cognitive virtue.
Aquinas holds we cannot have complete or true virtue without char-
ity.30 Charity is a virtue of personal love of God, which Aquinas refers to as 
a kind of “friendship” between a human and God. But Aquinas notes that 
wishing someone well does not constitute friendship. Instead: “a certain 
mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: 
and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.”31 
Friendship requires both mutual love between parties and communica-
tion as necessary conditions. The human-God species of friendship, then, 
will involve not only mutual affection, but some kind of communication. 
As we will see, Aquinas thinks God takes the initiative in founding this 
friendship because God shares with human beings knowledge of Himself.
29Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae 3, 8. 
30See especially Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 23, 6–8. 
31Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 23, 2. 
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Yet friendship with God is not something human beings are naturally 
capable of having.32 Not only are humans born in a state where they are 
unable to choose actually to engage in relationship with God (original 
sin), but they also lack the right capacities (cognitive, etc.) to be in personal 
relationship with God.33 God therefore needs to give grace and cause the 
human being to undergo a kind of ontological change where the human 
being shares in God’s own mode of existence (sanctifying grace).34 What-
ever this state involves, the important point is that God gives the human 
being certain capacities (infused virtues, theological virtues, Gifts of the 
Holy Spirit) that enable them to engage in personal relationship with 
God.35 In sum, because the human being is made by God to be like God, 
the human being can know and love God in a similar way to how God 
knows and loves Himself.
Thomas therefore holds that salvation is a process of “divinization/
deification,” coming to be like God, and this process involves a change 
in cognitive as well as affective dispositions.36 Human beings not only 
change what they do, but how they are. Aquinas is echoing a traditional 
Christian vision of salvation, inherited from the early Church. This view of 
salvation is highly ecumenical and defended extensively by contemporary 
theologians.37 For that reason, one does not need to accept the details of 
the Thomistic theory in order to accept a picture of salvation as deification. 
That view, at minimum, involves the following two theses: that salvation 
lies in metaphysical likeness to God through personal relationship, and 
God’s grace is necessary to permit people to have the capacity to engage 
in this relationship.
Thomas begins the Summa Theologiae with an argument that salvation 
requires knowledge beyond “naturally” discoverable knowledge of God. 
First, special knowledge was necessary because “man is ordered to God 
as to an end which exceeds the comprehension of reasoning. . . . The end, 
however, must be first known by men, whose intentions and actions should 
be ordered to that end.”38 The second reason depends on the first: men 
32A complicated discussion, in Thomistic tradition, turns on the meaning of the term “ca-
pable” in this claim. Among some Thomists, there is a kind of remote capability for human 
beings to have the Beatific Vision called an “obediential potency.” I am leaving aside the 
complexities of this discussion, and merely focusing on the far less controversial claim that 
supernatural activities of union with God, in virtue of being supernatural, are beyond nat-
ural human capabilities. 
33Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIiae 109, 2. 
34Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae 110, 2
35See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIiae 110, 4 ad 1.
36Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIiae 112, 11. See also Hofer, “Aquinas, Divinization, and 
the People in the Pews,” 54–72.
37There is an extensive literature on the topic. For example, Christensen and Wittung, 
Partakers of the Divine Nature; Meconi and Olson, Called to be the Children of God; Williams, The 
Ground of Union; Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition.
38Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 1,1 [quia homo ordinatur ad Deum sicut ad quendam 
finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit. . . . Finem autem oportet esse praecognitum 
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would not know securely or with certainty even the naturally knowable 
truths that are necessary for understanding that goal. Both responses in-
volve some presuppositions Aquinas makes about motivation and human 
choice. For Aquinas, all human action involves the intellect’s perceiving 
something as a good, which the will is then enabled to desire as its object 
and so act upon in a variety of ways (e.g., mere wish, decision, etc.). Con-
sequently, nothing can be chosen by my will without a prior intellectual 
act whereby I come to see why I have a reason for action; i.e., I “perceive” 
some end as good and then can choose means to achieve it. 39 Human 
action is end-oriented, and any intentional act requires understanding of 
an end before a human can intend to act in any way.40
Aquinas notes that God has given human beings a special goal in life: 
personal relationship with Him. This end would require knowledge 
not merely of God acquired from God’s effects (e.g., natural theology), 
but of God as He is in Himself and as having specific intentions toward 
humans.41 But, then, we run into a problem: God is both beyond human 
comprehension and not directly accessible to our cognition. God is an en-
tirely immaterial being, so we can at most reason to Him from His effects 
in sensible reality, but His immaterial nature is not directly accessible be-
cause of our cognitive limitations.42 Human cognitive powers are oriented 
toward material, sensible things, and not immaterial ones. For this reason, 
if we are to act so as to enter into a relationship with God, who is beyond 
the natural scope of our cognitive abilities, “it was necessary for the salva-
tion of men that something be made known to them by divine revelation 
which exceeds [the natural power of] human reason.”43
This engaging in friendship with God requires that a human has 
knowledge necessary to do so, and it is this knowledge that permits affec-
tive states in relation to God (e.g., charity, or other consequent virtues or 
Gifts). Aquinas even responds to an objection here that union involving 
hominibus, qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem.] 
39The argumentative strategy in the Summa Theologiae is practically identical with that 
used elsewhere in the corpus for this same point; cf., Summa Contra Gentiles I 5, 2: “nobody 
tends toward something studiously and with zeal unless they first perceive it.” [Nullus enim 
desiderio et studio in aliquid tendit nisi sit ei praecognitum.]
40Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 22. 
41Aquinas claims that belief in the Trinity, a properly revealed doctrine about God’s na-
ture, is required of all people at all times, and in God’s actions in Christ, but he qualifies that 
this faith can be (as I will explain later) implicit. While belief in the Incarnation is explicitly 
qualified as encompassing in a general belief in divine providence, Aquinas is less clear how 
the Trinity is implicit in other beliefs. On one Thomistic theory, belief in the existence of 
God and His Providence, termed “primary credibilia” is sufficient for salvation (see Nichols, 
Chalice of God, 94). While I take no stand on this here, it is noteworthy the way Aquinas states 
the issue might indicate that a believer needs to hold some doctrine about God as He is in 
Himself beyond belief in God’s mere existence, perhaps that God is “sovereign Goodness.” 
Cf., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 2, 7, ad 3, and 2, 8, resp. and ad 1–3. 
42Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 12, 12. 
43Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 1, 1 [necessarium fuit homini ad salutem, quod ei nota 
fierent quaedam per revelationem divinam, quae rationem humanam excedunt].
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only our affective faculties—love—would be sufficient for a relationship 
with God without knowledge of Him. Aquinas responds that our union 
with God is not union of a faculty or a part of the human person with 
God, but a complete union of our person to God in a mode appropri-
ately personal. A union of my “affective faculties” or acts with someone 
else—e.g., you and I both feeling the same emotion, but being unaware of 
each other, residing on either sides of the planet—would not be a friend-
ship. So, Aquinas plausibly suggests, a personal union of the friendship 
sort requires having right perception of what one loves.
As Aquinas sees it, friendship with God is like any other friendship 
insofar as not only do both parties need to love each other, but their love 
needs to be mutually responsive, and this involves cognition of some kind. 
(It seems plausible to cash out this requirement in contemporary language 
of “joint attention” and “shared knowledge,” which are cognitive states to 
some degree.44) Thus, Aquinas concludes: “Since communion with God 
in the good is a prerequisite for friendship with him, unless we believe 
that such a communion is possible . . . we will never develop a friendship 
with him. God might indeed love us, wish us good and do good for us, 
but unless he makes this known to us, we will not become his friends.”45 
Therefore, Aquinas concludes that we can have a personal relationship 
with God only if God reveals Himself to human beings as someone who 
wants to be friends with us, and that it is precisely this cognitive commu-
nication of God’s readiness to engage in a relationship that permits each 
to engage in truly mutual affection. As Aquinas says, we can only tend 
toward or seek God given that we know something about Him by the arti-
cles of faith, and so acceptance of God’s testimony about Himself is then a 
prerequisite for achieving deification (“salvific deiformity”).46 As we will 
see, Aquinas then argues that sustaining the cognitive states involved in 
this mutual awareness requires that the human have a cognitive virtue: 
faith.
2.b. Thomas Aquinas’s Cognitive Account of Faith
Aquinas is operating from the presupposition that Christian life aims at a 
personal relationship with God not merely in an afterlife but here below. 
But personal knowledge of God is required to enter into relationship with 
Him. Aquinas proposes that this personal knowledge of God, as required 
for friendship, is sustained in believers by a cognitive virtue: call this 
“Thomistic” faith. After presenting the essential features of this virtue 
44While the literature is voluminous on this topic, see for example Carpenter and Liebal, 
“Joint Attention, Communication, and Knowing Together in Infancy,” 159–181.
45Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 151. 
46Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 4, 7, ad 5. This claim will be qualified below. Aquinas 
holds that there are minimal beliefs necessary for forming a relationship with God, and these 
beliefs are outlined in such a way as to leave open the possibility that those who have never 
heard the preaching of the Christian Gospel can come to personal relationship with God 
because of such beliefs. 
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and its relationship to propositions, I will address the obvious objections 
to the cognitive account. This will show that Thomist faith is robust and 
valuable. Thomistic faith will illustrate not only that affective faith misses 
an important aspect of Christian life, but that affective faith is unmoti-
vated because (at least) one cognitive theory of faith can plausibly avoid 
the motivating objections.
Thomistic faith is an intellectual virtue by which a believer comes to 
accept certain propositions from God Himself and acquire testimonial 
knowledge. The nature of the virtue is cognitive, because the virtue aims 
at accepting propositions, but the believer is not exclusively motivated by 
“purely” cognitive reasons to accept these propositions. Aquinas says that 
faith involves the activity of the will in choosing to accept the testimony of 
God.47 In this, I am abstracting from whether and how acceptance of prop-
ositions from God comes about—I do not consider how acts of faith are 
justified. It is noteworthy for our purposes that Aquinas rejects the view 
that the assent of faith can be compelled by the weight of the evidence.48 
Aquinas has a story that involves God’s grace moving a person to accept 
what is proposed by revelation.49 Nevertheless, Aquinas believes that the 
case of faith is relevantly like accepting testimony from another human 
being, but that God’s grace is necessary for the hearer to understand or 
otherwise perceive that God is proposing some propositions to the hearer 
for belief.50
What does God propose for acceptance? God needs to reveal Himself 
in order to allow human beings to be in a personal relationship with Him. 
In an ordinary relationship with another person, I need to perceive that 
person as a person before I can have any relationship at all. Similarly 
with God, the key propositions that God reveals are those which concern 
facts about God’s personal nature as, for example, that God is a Trinity of 
Persons. While Aquinas thinks we can acquire natural knowledge of God 
as cause of the universe, these revealed statements are not such natural 
knowledge, but rather expressions of how God understands Himself.51 
Trinitarian propositions are the best examples of properly revealed truths, 
being things only God can know.52 Without God revealing them, Aquinas 
47Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 4, 2. 
48A very clear account of Thomistic faith that construes faith as testimonial knowledge 
can be found in Lamont, Divine Faith; for a discussion of justification and motivation of ac-
cepting God’s testimony, see esp. 187–206. 
49Cf., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 6, 1 but also IIaIiae 2, 9, ad 3. 
50Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 6, 1 [since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is 
raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle 
moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the 
chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace].
51Gregory Rocca describes this as the switch between thinking of truth in concepts as 
“meaning-dependent” and instead switching to seeing the meaning of divine names as 
“truth-dependent.” While limited in being phrased in human concepts, the referent of what 
is predicated is modified; Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 195. 
52Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, 298. 
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thinks, we could never know God is a Trinity. Therefore, because humans 
have no cognitive access to God’s essence, we cannot “verify” that God is 
a Trinity, and can only take it on God’s say-so.
It is these particular kinds of propositions that facilitate coming to un-
derstand God personally. Initially, humans do not know fully what these 
propositions mean.53 Yet they are true statements about God’s personal na-
ture, and they facilitate a growth in mutual awareness and love. Aquinas 
compares the process of moving from faith to deeper cognitive aware-
ness of God with the case of a student who accepts his teacher’s say-so on 
some matter he is being taught and then comes to understand the matter 
more fully later. 54 Aquinas thinks it is on the basis of this propositional 
awareness of God that a person can acquire non-propositional mystical 
acquaintance with God, as God will “indwell” the believer as long as they 
have loving faith.55
Aquinas holds that faith ordinarily requires assent to propositions. 
First, there are good reasons that we might only be able to be aware of 
God in the right way through propositions. Humans are not cognitively 
equipped to recognize God’s intentions without His help; also, God has to 
“lower” Himself to accommodate our ordinary ways of knowing. But why 
propositions in particular? Here we can be a bit speculative: for Aquinas, 
natural knowledge of God in this life is limited to indirect knowledge of 
God via His effects. Yet the kind of knowledge required to form a relation-
ship must also be personal in allowing us to learn who God is as a person. 
Communication involving propositions seems to be the only way to do 
this. God is utterly simple and beyond our comprehension, so who and 
what God is has to be explained using sets of propositions suitable to our 
way of knowing.56
Second, there are good independent reasons for God to use proposi-
tions to communicate with us. Aquinas thinks one could also be made 
aware of God by special revelation. Such revelations are, comparatively, 
rare.57 We can speculate that Aquinas thinks God has good reasons for 
not revealing Himself ordinarily in these ways. One good to be gained 
by learning the faith from others is the promotion of charity among 
human beings who form the Church on earth—they are not self-sufficient 
to engage in relationship with God by themselves, but require apostles, 
53Smith, Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology, 191. 
54Thomas Aquinas, In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio, I-1, nn. 61–82. 
55The three intellectual Gifts are understanding (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 8), 
knowledge (9), and wisdom (45). The one most resembling non-propositional acquaintance 
is wisdom. 
56Although it refers to the complexity of propositions in general, Aquinas, Summa Theolo-
giae IIaIIae 1, 2. Cf., IiaIIae 1, 6 ad 2. Consider why Aquinas rules out prophetic visions as a 
suitable means for union with God: Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 171, 1. 
57Aquinas proposes, however, that revelations of Christ might have occurred either ex-
plicitly or privately before Christ by the ministry of the angels (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 
IIaIiae 2, 5 ad 3). 
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evangelists, teachers, pastors, and so forth.58 Humans can transmit prop-
ositions in verbal or written sentences, but they could not do so with 
non-propositional knowledge.
As we saw, Aquinas does believe there is non-propositional knowl-
edge of God through mysticism. Yet mystical acquaintance with God, the 
non-propositional knowledge believers can have of God through the Gifts 
of the Holy Spirit, presumes the presence of the theological virtues of faith, 
hope, and love.59Aquinas allows that, for example, the Gift of Wisdom 
enables the believer to judge about God not by reasoning or propositional 
knowledge, but by what Aquinas calls a kind of sympathy or connatu-
rality (compassio sive connaturalitas) with God. As the Gift of Wisdom is 
precisely connatural knowledge that arises from love of God, the believer 
could not have the Gift of Wisdom or any similar connatural knowledge 
of God without already having charity.60 And, as we have already seen, 
Aquinas holds that faith is the foundation of right relationship with and 
love of God: “As the principle of corporeal love lies in vision by means 
of a corporeal eye, so similarly that which begins spiritual love ought to 
be on account of the intellectual vision of what can be loved spiritually. 
The vision of that spiritually lovable thing, namely God, is something not 
possible for us to have in the present life except through faith.”61 In sum, 
faith involves propositions both because of our cognitive limitations and 
because propositions facilitate (directly or indirectly) forming the right 
kind of relationship with God. Without faith, it would not be possible for 
human beings to come to love God in the way that produces their ultimate 
beatitude.62
2.c. Responding to the Motivating Objections
Whether or not Aquinas is correct that faith strictly requires propositions, 
he gives us a picture of how we could reasonably expect that faith ordi-
narily involves such propositions. I argue, then, Thomas’s account makes 
58This is the point of the gratuitous graces (like the grace of words, Aquinas, Summa Theo-
logiae IIaIIae, 177, 1) and of duties in the Church (Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 183, 2). 
59E.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIiae 68, 8, resp. and ad 2. 
60Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 45, 2. 
61Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 118 [Sicut enim amationis corporalis principium est 
visio quae est per oculum corporalem, ita etiam dilectionis spiritualis initium esse oportet 
visionem intelligibilem diligibilis spiritualis. Visio autem illius spiritualis diligibilis quod 
est Deus, in praesenti haberi non potest a nobis nisi per fidem: eo quod naturalem rationem 
excedit; et praecipue secundum quod in eius fruitione nostra beatitudo consistit. Oportet 
igitur quod ex lege divina in fidem rectam inducamur].
62Although it is important to note that one could follow the main of Aquinas’s account 
that we require the right kind of personal knowledge of God, but nevertheless deny this 
knowledge is even ordinarily propositional. Nevertheless, such a view would be opposed 
to non-cognitivism about faith because of the constitutive role of knowledge. The view 
could lead to a variant non-cognitivism, however, if it were true not only that we have 
non-propositional awareness of God but also that this awareness cannot be communicated 
in propositions of any sort. Such a view would require a different response than the one I 
offer of Kvanvig’s version of non-cognitivism. 
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it clear how propositions relate internally to the valuable cognitive virtue 
that is faith. And we will see that faith is nevertheless valuable in addition 
to the value of the truth of those propositions. If this is true, Thomistic 
faith avoids the first of Kvanvig’s criticisms.
Aquinas holds faith can be defined as “a habit of mind making the intel-
lect to assent to that which is not apparent, by which eternal life is begun 
in us.” It is the latter part of that definition that highlights the internal 
connection of salvation to belief as a cognitive virtue. The knowledge of 
God constitutive of our happiness in heaven is contained virtually in the 
propositions to which faith assents—in other words, they refer to God and 
enable us to come to know Him more fully.63 By adhering to the truths 
of the faith, we can stand outside of merely human knowledge and be 
“deified” through participating in God’s self-knowing.64 Aquinas uses this 
point to claim that all believers share “the mind of Christ.”65 The value of 
faith as a cognitive virtue is that it enables a human being to know God as 
God knows Himself.
We can see why the virtue is distinct from the propositions, because 
Aquinas holds that one needs to accept the relevant propositions because 
they were proposed for belief by God. Aquinas uses the case of the “faith” 
of demons (mentioned in the Epistle of St. James) as an illustration. The 
demons acquire cognitive certainty that some propositions are being 
proposed by God for belief because of their special cognitive capaci-
ties—demons can recognize a true prophet, miracles, etc. They know God 
always tells the truth, so they come to acquire knowledge and belief in 
those propositions.66 Nevertheless, Aquinas holds, the demons lack the 
virtue of faith, even though they believe all the same propositions that 
a Christian believes. Demonic faith is not a cognitive virtue because the 
demons did not accept these propositions for the right reasons. A believer 
has a cognitive virtue not merely because they accept some propositions, 
but because they accept the propositions in a cognitively virtuous manner: 
believers accept the propositions because they trust God and accept His 
testimony. The demons do not accept the propositions because they trust 
God (they don’t); demons came independently to see some propositions 
were true.
Aquinas therefore proposes that the “object” of faith is really God 
Himself as testifier, trust in whom is the reason one assents to whatever 
propositions He proposes for belief. Aquinas uses the language of “formal 
object” to refer to the fact that God is the object of the believer’s trust, and 
“material object” to refer to the propositions that are accepted in virtue of 
63Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 4, 1 [habitus mentis, qua inchoatur vita aeterna in 
nobis, faciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus].
64Aquinas, In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio, VII-1, nn. 50–57.
65Aquinas, Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura, caput 2, lec. 3. 
66Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 5, 2.
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that trust.67 The demons go wrong because, although they accept the ma-
terial objects of faith (the propositions), they do not have the right formal 
object: trust in God. Kvanvig objects: “The idea that one must believe a 
certain set of doctrines, independent of coming to see them as true from 
a love of truth, is baffling.”68 Yet, for Aquinas, God is Truth itself (“First 
Truth”), and one has saving faith only when one assents to what God re-
veals because you love God, who is Truth.69 Thus, ironically, it is precisely 
love for Truth that is supposed to motivate the believer to accept propo-
sitions God proposes. Further, it is only when the believer assents out of 
respect for the Truth that they have Thomistic faith. The difference is then 
that Aquinas thinks love of true propositions is not mutually exclusive 
with, but complements, love of God. As God is that First Truth in virtue of 
which propositions are true, believing a proposition because God testifies 
to its truth can better exemplify love of the truth than believing a proposi-
tion because one comes to be independently convinced of its truth (e.g., 
being convinced by inductive reasoning).
What I have hoped to show in presenting Aquinas’s account of faith so 
far is that Thomistic faith is not merely assent to propositions, but a valu-
able doxastic attitude of epistemic trust in God. The second of Kvanvig’s 
criticisms, however, presented a different challenge. The second criticism 
was that a cognitive model of faith limited faith to those who profess ex-
plicit acceptance of some set of propositions, but that many people who 
had religious faith (Moses, Abraham, and the apostles) did not believe the 
same propositions. To respond to the second challenge, we should note 
that Aquinas holds there are strong cognitive limits on our knowledge 
of God.70 The propositions believed only need to be of the appropriate 
character for human beings to engage in relationship with God, and, as 
we will see, Aquinas’s construal of the requirement is relatively liberal. 
Aquinas proposes two conditions on the propositions involved in faith. 
The first is a negative condition: there will be a minimum necessary set 
of propositions to accept in order to count as having faith. The second is 
a positive condition: people can be obligated to believe different specific 
beliefs which follow from that minimum set of propositions, depending 
on circumstances, and failure to do so can be culpable.
The negative condition is easier to grasp. We might characterize the 
virtue of Thomistic faith as a form of intellectual humility. On one side, this 
virtue involves being deferential not only to God Himself, but also to those 
instruments of God’s revelation, such as Scripture, prophets, evangelists, or 
67Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 1, 1.
68Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 136. 
69The role of faith is a necessary condition for justification, Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 
IaIIae 113, 4, resp. and ad 1. Nevertheless, Aquinas also holds that there is the possibility of 
faith that is not informed by love of God. This is “formless faith,” and formless faith does 
not suffice for salvation. In this case, one would believe God, but not because one loves Him. 
70We cannot know what God is in this life, even by revelation; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 
I 12, 13 ad 1. 
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the Church’s pastors. This is why Aquinas holds that adherence to the doc-
trines passed down in Scripture and the hierarchical tradition of the Church 
is the only way to trust correctly in God’s testimony, as an “infallible rule 
of the faith.”71 And, as intellectual humility, faith not only involves assent, 
but withholding assent when appropriate. Duties of withholding assent 
are apparent in Thomas’s Trinitarian theology, where he thinks we have 
to avoid trying to say too much and restrain ourselves to what we know 
about the Trinity by revelation, sticking closely to the words of Scripture.72
We will therefore expect that, because faith is valuable in light of the 
personal relationship with God, the minimum propositions required to 
have faith will be beliefs that God exists as a personal being and that He is 
interested in engaging in relationship with human beings. Unsurprisingly, 
Aquinas explicitly identifies the minimum necessary set of propositions 
required to count as having faith as precisely these two beliefs: “all the 
articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as 
God’s existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according 
to Hebrews 11: ‘He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a 
rewarder to them that seek Him.’”73
Aquinas does not mean that all the articles of faith (e.g., Incarnation) 
are logical entailments of the belief that God exists and that He rewards 
those who seek Him. Rather, it seems instead that there are minimum be-
liefs required to have the right understanding of God, and then all other 
propositions God reveals can be considered as (a posteriori) specifica-
tions of those beliefs. These additional articles of faith that God revealed, 
Aquinas thinks, are cognitively valuable. Explicit knowledge of the Pas-
sion or Trinity give us moral guidance and help us know God better, so 
while theological elaboration is not sufficient for growth in charity, it is 
intrinsically suited to promote it.74
Aquinas thinks every saved person holds these two basic beliefs at 
least implicitly. Kvanvig actually concedes this point to Aquinas. While 
Abraham did not profess the Athanasian Creed, nor did Abraham explic-
itly endorse claims “that God is redemptive or that God is for us,” still 
Kvanvig thinks “it is obvious that, among his cognitive commitments can 
be found claims that entail that God is redemptive or that God is for us.”75 
Similarly, while Abraham or Moses or the Apostles did not profess the 
Athanasian or Nicene Creeds, it is plausible that they were committed to 
claims like the two Aquinas lays out as the minimal necessary for faith.
The positive condition on what needs to be believed is harder to enun-
ciate, as it depends on many factors, not least of which is what period of 
71Aquinas, In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio, I-1, nn. 29–40. 
72Smith, Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology, 154–156. cf., Sokolowski, “God’s Word and 
Human Speech,” 203. 
73Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 1, 7. 
74Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 1, 7 ad 2–4. 
75Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 80. 
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time and place a believer lives! Faith is a properly intellectual virtue, and 
so it ordinarily involves assent to propositions. But, as an attitude toward 
a person, the doxastic attitude of faith can take different objects in different 
situations, depending on how God has proposed a belief to you. Aquinas 
holds that God revealed Himself gradually to humanity over the course 
of history, and there are different obligations for different people. Moses, 
Abraham, and the Apostles therefore had different epistemic obligations, 
even if they all held the minimal necessary propositions required for faith. 
Aquinas rejects the view that everyone is required explicitly to believe, 
for instance, the propositions of the Athanasian Creed. Rather, whether 
you have the relevant virtue depends on your cognitive capacity, station, 
place, time, and many other factors. The key is that one is responsive to 
God from one’s situation.
Thomistic faith accommodates innocent epistemic errors. Even if a be-
liever disbelieves in some revealed propositions, you can still have faith 
if you retain the right attitude toward more basic propositions of the faith 
(e.g., “everything in Scripture is God’s word”).76 Failure in believing what 
is, in fact, the material object of faith does not automatically entail that 
one does not believe in the right formal object (e.g., someone might be 
misinformed as to what is in Scripture on the question of, say, whether 
Abraham was the father of Melchizedek). But this misinformation does 
not automatically mean that this person no longer believes in Scripture 
as God’s revelation. The easy way Aquinas proposes to tell whether this 
person has the virtue of faith is to correct them and observe the reaction of 
the believer: citing St. Augustine and the Decretals, “‘By no means should 
we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion 
may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful 
anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,’ 
because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine 
of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have differed either in 
matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so 
far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet 
defined by the Church.”77
But, as Aquinas immediately notes, we can be sure that someone who 
persists obstinately in their own opinion even when corrected or is such 
that they are not sensitive to the teaching of the Church or Scripture, is 
someone who lacks faith.78 Thus the reverse is equally possible: someone 
who denies one article of the faith, even if assenting to everything else in 
Scripture, can lack the formal motivation to believe of someone having 
faith.79 “Heresy” involves belief in some of the same propositions as be-
lievers, but not for the right reasons. Heresy is thus relevantly like what we 
76Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 2, 3. 
77Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 11, 2 ad 3. 
78Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 11, 2 ad 3.
79Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 5, 3, ad 2. 
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saw in demonic faith: believing in the articles of faith, e.g., because I think 
they are likely true, is to lack trust in God’s knowledge and instead to trust in 
my own. In this case, one is not expressing the right attitude toward God’s 
testimony by sifting through what one agrees or disagrees with.
Given that faith is an epistemically virtuous way we defer our judg-
ment to God, a species of intellectual humility, it is then clear why Aquinas 
thinks not deferring our judgment to God in matters proper to faith is 
an epistemic vice. This is analogous to what might be wrong in willfully 
distrusting known epistemic experts: teachers, scientists, etc. This is then 
how to interpret why vices of unbelief and of heresy are evil. These vices 
do not consist in merely not believing some propositions (just as faith is 
not merely belief in propositions). Heresy is a form of intellectual pride, 
and such pride is clearly a vice.80 The fact that such sins are possible (pace 
Kvanvig) does not seem more problematic than holding that sins can be 
committed with our intellects as well as with our bodies. A person can sin 
from an inordinate desire for knowledge just as well as other from other 
desires; e.g., Nazi doctors misused a desire for scientific knowledge to 
justify atrocities. So it seems perfectly possible that not believing in cer-
tain revealed propositions could in some cases be culpable and lead to 
damnation. As faith is a prerequisite to love of God, so, in virtue of being 
someone who does not believe for the right reasons, a true heretic does 
not love God.
Kvanvig also seems to accept the possibility that breaking faith can 
merit punishment at least in some circumstances, as he acknowledges 
that there might be reasonable and acceptable ways to sanction those who 
break communion of faith with other Christians.81 However, Kvanvig 
often rhetorically links a cognitive theory of faith with the view that devia-
tions from doctrine should require ecclesial sanctions. Nevertheless, there 
are two distinct questions involved—whether faith constitutively involves 
cognitive states and whether we can punish people for deviant cognitive 
states. Even if it is true that heresy can be, in some cases, a moral evil, such 
a view of heresy would not entail approval of any vehement condemna-
tory rhetoric surrounding heresy, state or ecclesial sanctions of heretics, 
particular ways of speaking about or to heretics (e.g., anathemas), and 
so forth.82 Whether, how, or under what circumstances Christians ought 
80Although the proximate end of heresy is a kind of intellectual pride, Aquinas also thinks 
one could be a heretic for covetousness as well as for more general pride; Summa Theologiae 
IIaIIae 11, 1 ad 2 [“the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one’s own false opinion, and 
from this it derives its species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from 
pride or covetousness”].
81Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 75–76 gives a comparatively positive account of excommu-
nication (Kvanvig calls this all “anathema,” but he seems to mean a practical sanction like 
excommunication) in the life of the early Church.
82It is helpful to recall that, for Aquinas, there can be many cases of “material” heresy, 
where one non-culpably comes to believe something erroneous about the Christian faith. 
Such non-culpable error is not best dealt with by condemnations and, in fact, such condem-
nations are inappropriate. By illustration, one can see such a theory of non-culpable error 
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to sanction their own members, whether for heresy or anything else in 
general, is a distinct issue from what faith does or does not constitutively 
involve. A Thomistic account of faith does not require a particular theory 
of ecclesial sanctions and so I see no need to defend such a view here.
Thomistic faith is premised on the view that salvation constitutively 
involves personal friendship with God. As friendship requires mutual 
attention and awareness, friendship requires some cognitive states in the 
friends. Aquinas then argues that the relevant cognitive states that human 
beings could have toward God, in order to be aware of Him, have to come 
through revelation and ordinarily involve propositions. Consequently, the 
virtue of Thomistic faith is an epistemic virtue of reliance on God’s testi-
mony about Himself—it is, simply, a form of epistemic humility. Not only 
does faith lead to assent to propositions, but also restraint from affirming 
too much and overstepping epistemic boundaries. Finally, it becomes 
clear why people might possess the same virtue of faith even though they 
have varying moral obligations to believe different sets of propositions, 
depending on their circumstances. Thomistic faith is valuable because it 
is partially constitutive of a human being’s loving relationship with God.
Three Issues with Non-Cognitivism
3.a. First: Cognitive Faith is More Valuable
If we compare the two views, a first reason to prefer Thomistic faith is that 
affective faith is either not intrinsically valuable or only valuable when it 
forms part of a complex state. The value of affective faith is dependent both 
on the nature of the ideal to which one commits and how one commits to 
that ideal. This is illustrated in the fact that affective faith can take on var-
ious ideals, and there seem to be no limits on what ideals one can commit 
to by affective faith. Kvanvig utilizes this feature very often to argue that 
non-cognitivism is more pluralist or inclusive than cognitivism, because 
commitment to an ideal can involve any number of kinds of ideals and 
we cannot a priori rule out any ideal as valuable for someone. This raises 
a worry that Kvanvig could admit commitment to any number of ideals, 
from morally praiseworthy to despicable, as equally instances of affective 
faith. In general, one might think that the ideal to which one commits is 
that which has intrinsic value or disvalue, and it is from the ideal that the 
virtue derives its value.83 For one to commit to a despicable ideal with 
affective faith would be morally odious, not praiseworthy.
While Kvanvig disclaims that there are any criteria internal to affec-
tive faith to differentiate these ideals, Kvanvig does offer criteria external 
implicit in the way that theological dialogue with other Christians involves embracing a 
principle of charitable interpretation. 
83This worry does not presume a “unity of the virtues” thesis (that one cannot have any of 
the virtues unless one has them all) which is an assumption Kvanvig explicitly denies (Faith 
and Humility, 143). Rather, the worry is that, whether by itself or in combination with any 
other virtuous states, affective faith only appears valuable instrumental to attain some other 
intrinsically virtuous state or state of affairs.
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to affective faith that would rule out these cases. Kvanvig gives a partial 
account of how affective faith needs to be counter-balanced by humility, 
and perhaps another executive virtue, and it is only the complex state of 
having affective faith + humility ( + wisdom?) that is truly valuable.84 Tra-
ditionally, by comparison, practical wisdom (i.e., prudence) is a virtue that 
is a quasi-intellectual virtue, by which an agent perceives in truth when 
and how to act rightly; i.e., it is essential to practical wisdom that one have 
correct cognitive perception of moral reality (whatever that is). Kvanvig 
introduces a similar requirement into humility. According to Kvanvig, 
humility involves “directing of attention for the right reasons.”85 Humility 
then, like prudence, essentially involves cognitive states conforming to 
reality and to the true or appropriate reasons for action. For this reason, 
those ideals worth having are only those which constitutively involve the 
right reasons for action. If this is the way to understand Kvanvig’s overall 
picture, then affective faith is best described neither as intrinsically or 
instrumentally valuable, but as a constitutive aspect of a more complex 
state.86 Yet, as the further state of affective faith involving humility is what 
is truly valuable, it would appear that affective faith is of dubious char-
acter as a virtue in its own right apart from these other states.
By contrast, Aquinas’s account of the theological virtue of faith has an 
entirely different object. Thomistic faith is about a person, not an ideal 
or pattern of behavior—God is First Truth and Love itself. As God is 
First Truth, He is uniquely trustworthy, and so the believer gains a kind 
of infallibility in what they believe.87 Thomistic faith involves attention 
to propositions, but is primarily attention to a person proposing those 
propositions and to whom those propositions refer—God. A™t least, if 
humility is valuable, Thomistic faith is too. The Thomistic virtue of faith is 
therefore like a species of intellectual humility whereby the believer prac-
tices appropriate cognitive deference to God. Thomistic faith is valuable 
as ordinarily constitutive of a relationship with God. Love is impossible 
without faith, and faith that is livened by charity is the beginning of what 
it is to possess the eternal happiness of heaven even while on earth.88
The virtue of Thomistic faith is thus valuable independently of 
the value of the knowledge gained thereby. Faith is the beginning of a 
84Kvanvig makes this point in the context of religious faith, in Faith and Humility, 131. In 
order, for example, to correct the way some virtues can go wrong, Kvanvig seems to balance 
one virtue against another, as in the example that humility would be needed to correct “un-
balanced” affective faith; 152–153. 
85Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 198. 
86Thank you to Mark Murphy and anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. 
87Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 1, 3.
88Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 4, 1. Even in the case of a believer having what Aquinas 
calls “lifeless” or “unformed” faith, faith in the absence of love of God, Aquinas thinks that 
lifeless faith is still a valuable disposition both epistemically and morally. In addition to the 
value of having beliefs about God that are true, it seems plausible that having lifeless faith 
facilitates acts of repentance (e.g., going to confession) and causes the believer to be less evil 
than might otherwise be the case. Cf., Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 4, 4–5; IIaIIae 7, 2 ad 2. 
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personal relationship with God, which is immensely valuable. Having 
faith permits the believer to participate in shared attention with God, both 
in loving God and developing that attention so that the believer comes to 
participate in God’s own cognitive and affective states (the Gifts). Faith, a 
constitutive part of that relationship, is therefore intrinsically valuable.89 If 
we are looking for an account of faith that makes faith intrinsically valu-
able, or even merely worth-having in its own right, we thus have very 
good reasons to opt for the Thomistic account rather than affective faith.
3.b. Second: Affective Salvation is Impersonal
The second problem is that affective faith does not seem to be able to have 
personal relationship with God as a constitutive element. Kvanvig never 
directly says what salvation is, and, methodologically, he aims to discuss 
faith apart from salvation.90 But Kvanvig’s claim seems to be that affective 
faith would be sufficient to be “salvific faith,” i.e., sufficient for salvation.91 
We can reconstruct the broad strokes: non-cognitive salvation is confor-
mity to an ideal of some sort. Kvanvig identifies the ideal at the core of 
religious (Christian) faith a commitment to bring about the “Kingdom of 
God.” What this means is exemplified by Jesus Christ’s pattern of behavior 
on earth. But the believer only needs “pro-attitudes” toward Jesus rather 
than any definite beliefs about him.92 That is to say anyone can commit to 
acting as Jesus Christ did, without ever even believing that Jesus Christ 
existed at some point in history, just like I can act like Superman without 
believing that Superman is a historical figure. While there are cognitive 
beliefs that the believer ordinarily holds, e.g., “Jesus acted in such-and-
such a manner,” these are incidental to the commitment. I have affective 
faith if my behavior aims consistently (committedly) at the ideal: bringing 
about the Kingdom.
There is a worry here. As noted earlier, Kvanvig holds that whatever be-
liefs or cognitive states that are held can be indeterminate, and he applies 
this claim directly to religious faith. People with religious faith “might 
include various kinds of skeptics and agnostics regarding the existence 
of God and any or all of the central claims of the major world religions. 
That is, one can commit to a certain ideal, even to being an unconditional 
follower of Jesus or Mohammed or whatever, without any of the standard 
cognitive attitudes of ordinary folk on such paths.”93 Kvanvig’s inclusion 
of skeptics or agnostics among “believers” makes it unclear whether any 
89This is true even if faith ceases to be operative in the afterlife. Faith is a valuable attitude 
toward God, whether it is replaced by another attitude or not. E.g., if I trust my parents as a 
child in their decision to have me learn a musical instrument, and then as an adult see good 
reasons to play an instrument, the attitude of trust is no less valuable even if it was no longer 
necessary to motivate my playing the instrument as an adult. 
90Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 105. 
91Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 93, 77, 166–118, 128, 136.
92Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 116. 
93Kvanvig, “Affective Theism,” 140. 
484 Faith and Philosophy
internal affective and conative attitudes are essential to any commitment 
to an ideal (e.g., “multiple realizability”). We might think, by contrast, that 
an ideal is always a rational goal of some sort, such that one has to have 
some reasons to count as acting for an ideal.
Consider a charitable reading that affective faith includes internal 
attitudes but no beliefs. We here imagine the believer imitates Christ’s 
affective and conative attitudes. Plausibly, Christ loves God as His Father. 
The believer should then come to love God as Father in the course of 
imitating Christ’s affections. It is nevertheless very hard to see how such 
an attitude of personal love and relationship could be sustained without 
belief in the propositions “that God exists,” or similar claims. I cannot, for 
example, have a personal relationship with Superman because Superman 
does not exist. Kvanvig responds to such criticism by noting that one can 
act in regard to persons by way of hoping they exist, as someone could 
commit to a project of seeking advice from a hermit without knowing that 
this hermit exists.94 The affective believer is committing to draw closer to 
God by their actions and affections; the more pronounced that process 
becomes, the more the affective believer appears to love God.
Certainly, the love you have for someone you hope exists is a kind of 
love. Yet the love involved in a believer coming to imitate a standard set 
by another (another person that they have no essential cognitive beliefs 
about, including their existence) is not the love that produces or is consti-
tutive of a friendship. In sum, the relevant attitude constituting friendship 
does not seem possible if you are not sure if the Other exists. This does not 
require that I am explicitly conscious of the Other, or that I can describe 
the Other propositionally, but only that there is cognitive content on my 
part in virtue of which I am responsive to that Other and the truth of which 
matters to whether I am in a friendship or not. Obviously, a person can be 
unsure, e.g., if a friend of theirs is still alive or reading their letters. But if I 
never have beliefs that you exist, I can only be in a pretended relationship.
However, it gets worse. This view might not be non-cognitivism if 
certain act-types are constituted by beliefs. While I can act in promoting 
democracy without believing in the existence of democrats, I cannot 
promote democracy without beliefs about democracy. The concept “de-
mocracy” is internal to that action-type. I cannot love someone without 
knowing anything about them or being acquainted with them, and I 
cannot be their friend if they don’t exist. On the other hand, I need no 
concept of air currents in order to do something that counts as moving 
the air. E.g., my actions could certainly count as moving ambient air, even 
absent a concept of “ambient air.” We can preserve the non-cognitivism of 
the account by holding that what counts as “service of an ideal,” is purely 
the external state of affairs or pattern of behavior aimed at. Perhaps this 
makes sense for other cases, but this seems an odd way to think of the 
Christian life, unless the Kingdom were purely a matter of external affairs. 
94Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 114. 
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I do not know how to prove this, but it seems very plausible that such a 
move would rule out the central case: having a relationship is not merely 
to bring about an external state of affairs.95 Affective faith, even if it can be 
made plausible, ultimately does not aim at the same thing that Thomistic 
cognitive faith aims at. Cognitive faith aims essentially at forming a re-
lationship with a person, God, whereas affective faith aims at an ideal of 
behavior or a way that the world should be. This difference, however, is 
highly significant.
3.c. Third: Differing Paradigms
The final point is a more profound and serious disagreement that I cannot 
here resolve, but which I will try to present. If Kvanvig’s objections against 
cognitive faith are accurate, or if affective religious faith is faith sufficient 
for salvation (i.e., saving faith), it would follow that traditional Christian-
ity’s complete theological paradigm is fundamentally flawed. I concede 
that traditional Christianity could be grossly mistaken about the nature 
of its own claims, and I will not attempt to rebut a skeptical position that 
is a normative rather than descriptive account of Christian faith. Never-
theless, I will end by proposing that affective faith nevertheless cannot 
explain central features of a religious attitude that many of us could see 
as valuable.
Kvanvig acknowledges cognitivism about religious faith as the “re-
ceived” view of Christianity, indicated by the way Church authorities have 
delimited doctrinal beliefs as necessary for salvation. Yet Kvanvig thinks 
this is all the worse for dogma.96 He proposes that the traditional Christian 
emphasis on doctrine arose and became dominant, despite being alien to 
the essence of Christianity, because of historical contingencies. The story, 
in short, is that political forces (and specifically the Emperor Constantine) 
transformed Christianity from a purely affective religion of love, which 
held no appreciable or essential doctrinal beliefs about God or Jesus, to 
one of anathema and condemnation that utilized doctrine in enforcing 
conformity for political ends.97 It is not clear to me whether Kvanvig’s 
historical account is supposed to be falsifiable by appeal to ecclesiastical 
95A final striking fact is that “grace” has no explicit place in Kvanig’s account and is not 
(as far as I can see) mentioned at all in the context of religious faith presented in Faith and 
Humility. Rather, Kvanvig sees faith as a natural, human virtue which can take religious 
ideals as its object. Grace seems necessary, then, only to provide us with information about 
a uniquely Christian ideal—committing to an ideal seems an ordinary human activity oth-
erwise. Specifically too, it seems a problem that Christ plays no important role in salvation 
beyond being an example of conduct; people with no experience of Christ can commit to a 
similar pattern of behavior as Christ’s. If such help from God is needed, the need for such 
help seems to be for reasons external to faith itself. But this seems very close to classical 
Pelagianism, which held that, apart from Christ’s example, we need no other special help 
from God in living a good life. Cf., Pohle,”Pelagius and Pelagianism.” 
96Kvanvig, “Affective Theism,” 126. 
97The story can be gleaned both from the more direct narration in Kvanvig, Faith and 
Humility, 82–88, but also 75, 136, and 199–201.
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history; as I am not a historian, I leave the matter to the side.98 Regardless, 
Kvanvig’s historical account seems to play a normative role rather than a 
descriptive one. If historical Christianity had never valued affective faith, 
it is unclear whether this would be a problem with historical Christianity 
or with affective faith.
Abstracting from the historical details, Kvanvig’s narrative about the 
rise of cognitive faith raises three serious theological and methodological 
questions. First, if Kvanvig’s narrative was correct that historical contin-
gencies led to the wholesale replacement of a central aspect of Christianity, 
all dominant Christian theological claims should be guilty until proven 
innocent. This includes not only views on faith and salvation, but also 
all sorts of beliefs. E.g., if Christians have been operating under delusion 
about faith for so long, why think Christians got “love” right? Second, 
the motivation for non-cognitivism involved a deep-seated suspicion of 
traditional claims to special access to God’s revelation (in Scripture/Tra-
dition) or activity (grace). If these claims are jettisoned, it is hard to see 
why the result leads us to more than a “religion of pure reason” or secular 
humanism. Finally, non-cognitivism requires a paraphrase or reinterpre-
tation of the way many Christians understand their theological claims, so 
that doctrinal claims should be read as having primarily practical rather 
than theoretical significance.99 As with emotivism, I will not rule out a 
priori that Kvanvig can offer these paraphrases, but it seems difficult to 
do so and I suspect results will not closely match traditional Christian 
claims.100 Loving and knowing another person is not easily paraphrased 
into language about commitment to an ideal of action.
Notice that I am arguing not that non-cognitivism is wrong. Rather, I 
am pointing out that the non-cognitivist account of faith has a cost. My 
point is therefore a caveat emptor more than a reductio ad absurdum. Kvan-
vig’s notion of faith differs from traditional Christian notions of faith and 
he recognizes this. The price of admission to non-cognitivism requires the 
traditional Christian to paraphrase their apparently cognitive beliefs about 
grace, God, Jesus, and so forth into quasi-emotivist semantics, or at least to 
relativize them significantly in terms of practical commitments. The cost, 
it seems to me, is quite high.101 I do not know how to argue against this 
apparently normative view.
98For an overview of recent historical research about earliest devotion to Jesus, see Hur-
tado, How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God? Chadwick also has a celebrated history of the 
early Church, The Early Church.
99Kvanvig gives some of these paraphrases in Faith and Humility, 75–76. 
100The attempted paraphrases of dogmatic claims to practical or affective claims, such as 
those pursued by liberal theologians like Tillich, have been largely unpersuasive to ordinary 
believers. 
101The non-cognitivist programme resembles, in important ways, the programmes out-
lined by Kant or Schleiermacher in regard to religion, and anyone is perfectly free to embrace 
such a programme, but we should have no illusions that their programmes are very different 
from traditional Christianity.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, first, some irenic considerations. The defenders of affective 
faith appear to presuppose a certain relationship between belief and evi-
dence. The view that faith is belief in propositions compelled by sufficient 
evidence seems implausible because, if a room full of philosophers cannot 
agree that the external world exists, how can they come to agree on the 
dogmas of the Athanasian Creed?102 On the other hand, if believers adhere 
to the doctrines of Christianity without sufficient evidence, then this atti-
tude of adhering to a set of propositions without evidence could appear 
closer to bigotry rather than any praiseworthy attitude, even if one waters 
down the required doctrinal propositions to a minimal set. The believer 
can hurl anathemas at those with whom they disagree, and countenance 
the worst treatment of people they take to be unbelievers.
Thomistic faith rejected this dilemma, because it rejects the envisioned 
connection between faith and evidence. Faith for Aquinas results not from 
having sufficient evidence to compel assent to the proposed doctrines, but 
from God moving the believer to assent through grace.103 Consequently, 
the attitude of being attentive to God, to be ready to assent to whatever He 
reveals, is what makes faith valuable and what leads us to accept the prop-
ositions that we need for salvation. For the same reason, the believer does 
not make the error of thinking (as does Aquinas’s heretic104) that they have 
sufficient evidence for those beliefs or comprehensive understanding of 
all of the articles of faith. The believer instead must rely on God’s under-
standing and knowledge, and faith is precisely that virtue of relying on 
God in this way—faith is a virtue of epistemic humility in relation to God.
Going slightly beyond Thomas’s picture, even more avenues for coin-
cidence can be found in John Henry Newman’s account of faith. Newman 
shares with Aquinas the view that faith involves belief in propositional 
doctrines and certainty that these doctrines are true, so that “without 
certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession and 
of observance, but there can be no habit of prayer, no directness of de-
votion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-sacrifice.”105 
Faith “does not demand evidence so strong as is necessary for what is 
commonly considered a rational conviction . . . it is mainly swayed by 
antecedent considerations.”106 Clearly, though, bigots too reason by such 
antecedent considerations, and abuse others with their narrowminded-
ness. Newman’s solution is that faith “takes its character from the moral 
state of the agent.”107 Faith is reasoning and assent to propositions because 
102This objection, phrased in this way, comes from one of the anonymous referees. 
103Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIiae 6, 1. 
104Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 11, 1.
105Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 220.
106Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford, 187.
107Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford, 249–250. 
488 Faith and Philosophy
of the good moral character of the agent, whereas bigotry results from 
a bad state.108 In other words, faith is a species of intellectual humility 
whereas bigotry is a species of intellectual pride.109 The check against faith 
going wrong and becoming bigotry is not philosophy or a better set of 
arguments, but love of God.
This supplement from Newman brings the Thomistic and affective 
pictures closer together. Kvanvig presumes that affective faith is valuable 
only when it constitutes a more complex state involving an additional 
virtue of humility. Kvanvig proposes, in describing this complex state, 
that humility is a virtue of attention to persons.110 Perhaps, then, affective 
and cognitive faith are valuable in distinct ways. Whereas affective faith is 
valuable in making us courageous in pursuit of valuable goals in life, cog-
nitive faith is valuable because it makes us humble before God, making 
us attentive to God and able to enter into a loving relationship with Him. 
On this vision of what cognitive faith entails, the fears about doctrine and 
dogma do not arise. Those who use dogma to attack others lack precisely 
the virtue of epistemic humility that is cognitive faith. “Those who say, ‘I 
love God’, and hate their brothers or sisters, are liars; for those who do not 
love a brother or sister whom they have seen, cannot love God whom they 
have not seen” (1 Jn. 4:20, NRSV).
Even if there is some irenic ground of coincidence such that both af-
fective and cognitive faith are valuable, it bears repeating that traditional 
Christianity does have apparently admirable, valuable states not explained 
or captured by Kvanvig’s account of affective faith. At the end of his life, 
several weeks after September 29th, 1273, Thomas Aquinas was saying 
Mass in a chapel dedicated to St. Nicholas. After he was finished with the 
Mass, he came out and the brothers of the Dominican convent noticed a re-
markable transformation in him: Thomas stopped his writing entirely and 
threw away his writing materials, even though he was mid-way through 
the incomplete final treatise of the Summa Theologiae. When questioned by 
his secretary, Reginald, as to the reason for the change, Thomas answered, 
“I cannot do any more. Everything I have written seems to me as straw in 
comparison with what I have seen.”111
Both Thomas’s writing and his putting aside the pen were admirable 
and praiseworthy. Being competent to distinguish the propositional 
articles of faith from their ultimate referent is no less a component of 
what it is to have faith than the disposition required in adhering to those 
propositions in the first place, given that the object of Thomistic faith 
(and hence of all properly revealed truths) is God Himself. Refusing to 
write appears praiseworthy because the knowledge of God Thomas had 
acquired through study, or indeed propositional belief about God, was 
108Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford, 239. 
109Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford, 305–311. 
110Kvanvig, Faith and Humility, 193–198.
111Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 289. 
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inferior to direct personal interaction with God Himself. Thomas accepted 
using propositions to learn about and love God, but was willing to put 
them aside in favor of “face-to-face” relationship with their referent. Af-
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